EconStor >
Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23820
  
Title:A Price is a signal: on intrinsic motivation and crowding-out PDF Logo
Authors:Bolle, Friedel
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 250
Abstract:If a previously unpaid activity (donating blood) is paid then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesised that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "market value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in, as well as persistence (or not) of the effect after the abandoning of payment is implied. This "naive" explanation is confronted with Bénabou and Tirole´s (2003) priciple-agent model where the opposite signalling effect is hypothesised: a higher price is taken as an indication for a lower value.
Subjects:Intrinsic Motivation
Crowding-out
Signaling
JEL:H42
D64
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
250_Bolle.pdf105.89 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23820

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.