EconStor >
Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Utility versus Income-Based Altruism PDF Logo
Authors:Kritikos, Alexander S.
Bolle, Friedel
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 249
Abstract:In Dictator Game experiments where the information status of the participants varies we find that a certain type of proposer tends to reduce his offers when the recipient has incomplete information about the pie size. We also find that a certain type of recipient tends to reject too small offers in the Impunity Game when the proposer has incomplete information about the recipient type. To explain these puzzling results we reconsider Becker's [1974] theory of altruism, which assumes that externalities are caused by other people's utility. When incomplete information about the other person is introduced, it turns out that his approach predicts – in contrast to other theories of altruism - that some altruistic persons will change their behavior as observed in our experiments. Thus, a kind of utility based altruism (and spite as its opposite form) can be assumed as the main principle governing behavior in this class of games.
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
249_Kritikos_Bolle.pdf265.11 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.