EconStor >
Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23817
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBreitmoser, Yvesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T12:03:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-30T12:03:08Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23817-
dc.description.abstractWhen voting takes place in democratic institutions, we find (either explicitly or implicitly) that there is an agenda setter or a formateur. Such players are uniquely able to make substantive proposals for given topics. Their statuses remain intact even after rejection of proposals, but they must revise rejected proposals constructively (e.g. towards a compromise). We model this in a general environment, show that the equilibrium outcome is generically unique, and characterize it explicitely. The equilibrium outcome is robust to (partially) binding communication between the formateur and the voters. As illustrations, we consider majority bargaining about a cake (leaned on Baron and Ferejohn,1989),where the formateur ends up being a perfect dictator, and a model of legislative voting (leaned on Jackson and Moselle,2002), where he is a dictator if his ideological position is within the quartiles of the parliament. In these cases, our model implements (reversed) McKelvey majority path. Depending on the valuations, the formateur´s power may be weakened when parliamentary decisions can be revised, as this may faciliate tacit collusion amongst the voters.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 247en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoalitional bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislatureen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperativeen_US
dc.titleA Theory of coalition Bargainingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn511456840en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:euvwdp:247-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
247_Breitmoser.pdf209.31 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.