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dc.contributor.authorKritikos, Alexander S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTan, Jonathan H. W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T12:03:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-30T12:03:05Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23812-
dc.description.abstractHow can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the first half as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half upon delivery of the service. This contract design is known as "indenture". It is self-enforcing and incentive-compatible. This paper experimentally tests the efficacy of the "indenture game" and its implications for cooperation in oneshot environments. We find that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected losses due to the existence of uncooperative types.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 241en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordContractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordIndentureen_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIndenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Testen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500818169en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:euvwdp:241-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

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