EconStor >
Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis PDF Logo
Authors:Kritikos, Alexander S.
Vigenina, Denitsa
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 231
Abstract:We empirically examine the efficacy of various incentives of microlending contracts such as joint-liability or group access to future loans. We find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. Furthermore, the incentive system leads to peer measures between the borrowers, helping the lender to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. We also demonstrate that the mechanism realizes high repayment rates, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we show that dynamic incentives have to be restricted if the two problems of joint-liability are to be tackled notably.
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
231_Kritikos_Vigenina.pdf122.03 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.