EconStor >
Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23802
  
Title:The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration on Bargaining Behavior: An Experimental Study PDF Logo
Authors:Kritikos, Alexander S.
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 230
Abstract:A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration, conventional and final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 10%, while the pie was equally split in less than half of the cases. Under conventional arbitration - where the arbitrator is free in choosing his award - every third negotiation ended in dispute giving evidence for a modified chilling effect. Under final offer arbitration – where the arbitrator has to award to the bargainers either one of their final offers - there was only a small increase of disputes while equal splits have doubled to 80%. The experiment shows final offer arbitration, though having lower dispute rates, to interfer more with bargaining behavior than conventional arbitration where the bargaining behavior was similar to the no-arbitration treatment. Under final offer arbitration, negotiators adjust their bargaining strategy to the arbitrator´s expected award.
Subjects:Bargaining
Arbitration
Experiments
Fair Awards
JEL:C91
D63
C78
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
230_Kritikos.pdf168.16 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23802

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.