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Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) >
IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23729
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dietrich, Diemo | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vollmer, Uwe | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-30T12:01:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-30T12:01:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-1555 | | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23729 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) Halle (Saale) | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Diskussionspapiere / Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 192 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G28 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incomplete contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | minimum capital requirements | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bank capital | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | disintermediation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | pro-cyclicality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kapitalstruktur | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eigenkapitalvorschriften | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kreditgeschäft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unvollständiger Vertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? : A functional approach | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 391530119 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IWH IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
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| 192.pdf | | 229.52 kB | Adobe PDF |
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