Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23558 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CoFE Discussion Paper No. 03/07
Verlag: 
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE), Konstanz
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimaltaxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, different to the existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public-good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.
Schlagwörter: 
tax competition
information exchange
JEL: 
H21
F42
F20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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