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dc.contributor.authorJin Kim, Jinen_US
dc.contributor.authorBoyd, John H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:08:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:08:56Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23496-
dc.description.abstractWe study a theoretical general equilibrium environment in which the only activity of interest is armed robbery. Agents choose whether to be citizens or robbers, and whether to purchase handguns. Armed citizens can protect themselves from robbery but any armed agent runs the risk of accidentally shooting himself or another agent. The government chooses a gun tax, and the intensity of police efforts to arrest would-be robbers and citizens who arm for self-defense. Properties of an equilibrium are characterized and the model is calibrated and solved. In all cases unique equilibria are obtained. We find that guns are an inefficient way of redistributing wealth, in the sense that social costs are very large relative to actual wealth redistribution. In this model society would be vastly better off if handguns could be eliminated. We do find, however, that handguns substantially deter crime when crime is defined as taking another?s wealth by force. Yet handguns cause accidental deaths and resultantly in this model policymakers confront a fundamental trade-off between property rights and gun deaths.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMinnesota working papers / University of Minnesota, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics 318en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelK40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwRüstungsguten_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA Theoretical Investigation of Handguns, Cops and Robbersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn377726753en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Minnesota Working Papers, Department of Economics - Center for Economic Research, University of Minnesota

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