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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien_US
dc.contributor.authorGilo, Daviden_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. In general, the incentives of firms to collude depend in a complex way on the whole set of partial cross ownership (PCO) in the industry. We show that when firms are identical, only multilateral PCO may (but need not) facilitate tacit collusion. A firm?s controller can facilitate tacit collusion further by investing directly in rival firms and by diluting his stake in his own firm. In the presence of cost asymmetries, even unilateral PCO by efficient firms in a less efficient rival can facilitate tacit collusion.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSIO working paper / Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization 0038en_US
dc.subject.keywordpartial cross ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated Bertrand oligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontrolling shareholderen_US
dc.subject.keywordcost asymmetriesen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.titlePartial cross ownership and tacit collusionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University

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