|
EconStor >
Northwestern University >
Department of Economics - Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Northwestern University >
CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467
|
| | |
| Title: | | Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion  |
| Authors: | | Spiegel, Yossi Gilo, David |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CSIO working paper / Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization 0038 |
| Abstract: | | This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. In general, the incentives of firms to collude depend in a complex way on the whole set of partial cross ownership (PCO) in the industry. We show that when firms are identical, only multilateral PCO may (but need not) facilitate tacit collusion. A firm?s controller can facilitate tacit collusion further by investing directly in rival firms and by diluting his stake in his own firm. In the presence of cost asymmetries, even unilateral PCO by efficient firms in a less efficient rival can facilitate tacit collusion. |
| Subjects: | | partial cross ownership repeated Bertrand oligopoly tacit collusion controlling shareholder cost asymmetries |
| JEL: | | D43 L41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|