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dc.contributor.authorBénabou, Rolanden_US
dc.contributor.authorTirole, Jeanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:07:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:07:16Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23457-
dc.description.abstractWe build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification effect? can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one?s generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers in economics / Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 230en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordrewardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmotivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordoverjustification effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordcrowding outen_US
dc.subject.keywordidentityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial norms.en_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.titleIncentives and Prosocial Behavioren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn504016350en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers in Economics, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS), Princeton University

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