Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422
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dc.contributor.authorSerifsoy, Barisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422-
dc.description.abstractAcademic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have beenpredominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empiricalliterature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself.While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly drivenby the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing businessenvironment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affectstock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the bestsuited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. Byemploying a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek toshed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchangeswith differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first stepindividual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regressthe derived values against variables that - amongst others - map the institutionalarrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivitydifferences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchangesand (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We findevidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency thanmutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth isconcerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possesshigher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with acustomer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership liepossibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneousmembers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting |x157en_US
dc.subject.jelF39en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.jelC61en_US
dc.subject.jelC24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexchangesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddemutualizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordeffciencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDEAen_US
dc.subject.keywordMalmquist-Productivityen_US
dc.subject.keywordTobit panel data regressionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbootstrappingen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapierbörseen_US
dc.subject.stwUmwandlungen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDemutualization, Outsider Ownership and Stock Exchange Performance - Empirical Evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn498452743en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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