Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422 
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dc.contributor.authorSerifsoy, Barisen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422-
dc.description.abstractAcademic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have been predominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empirical literature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself. While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly driven by the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing business environment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affect stock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the best suited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchanges with differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first step individual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regress the derived values against variables that - amongst others - map the institutional arrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivity differences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges and (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We find evidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency than mutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth is concerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with a customer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership lie possibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneous members.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aJohann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper Series: Finance & Accounting |x157en
dc.subject.jelF39en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelC23en
dc.subject.jelC61en
dc.subject.jelC24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexchangesen
dc.subject.keyworddemutualizationen
dc.subject.keywordeffciencyen
dc.subject.keywordDEAen
dc.subject.keywordMalmquist-Productivityen
dc.subject.keywordTobit panel data regressionsen
dc.subject.keywordbootstrappingen
dc.subject.stwWertpapierbörseen
dc.subject.stwUmwandlungen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDemutualization, Outsider Ownership and Stock Exchange Performance - Empirical Evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn498452743en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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