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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422
  

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dc.contributor.authorSerifsoy, Barisen_US
dc.coverage.temporal1999-2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23422-
dc.description.abstractAcademic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have been predominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empirical literature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself. While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly driven by the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing business environment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affect stock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the best suited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchanges with differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first step individual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regress the derived values against variables that - amongst others - map the institutional arrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivity differences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges and (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We find evidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency than mutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth is concerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with a customer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership lie possibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneous members.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting 157en_US
dc.subject.jelF39en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.jelC61en_US
dc.subject.jelC24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexchangesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddemutualizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordeffciencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDEAen_US
dc.subject.keywordMalmquist-Productivityen_US
dc.subject.keywordTobit panel data regressionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbootstrappingen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapierbörseen_US
dc.subject.stwUmwandlungen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDemutualization, Outsider Ownership and Stock Exchange Performance - Empirical Evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn498452743en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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