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EconStor >
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main >
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bannier, Christina E. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T16:05:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T16:05:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that obtain financing from both a ?relationship? bank and ?arm?s-length? banks. We find that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large degree. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting 148 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Risk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Relationship Lending | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Asymmetric Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Liquidity Crisis | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Finanzierungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kredit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risikomanagement | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Investor Relations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Projektfinanzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing, Optimal Business Risk and Information Disclosure | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 48439102X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Universität Frankfurt a. M.
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| 900.pdf | | 269.82 kB | Adobe PDF |
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