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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:05:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:05:27Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that obtain financing from both a ?relationship? bank and ?arm?s-length? banks. We find that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large degree.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting 148en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRisken_US
dc.subject.keywordRelationship Lendingen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLiquidity Crisisen_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKrediten_US
dc.subject.stwBanken_US
dc.subject.stwRisikomanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestor Relationsen_US
dc.subject.stwProjektfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHeterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing, Optimal Business Risk and Information Disclosureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn48439102Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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