Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23411 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting No. 146
Verlag: 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate governance
banking system
co-determination
board of directors
complementarity
financial system
JEL: 
G34
G32
G38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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