Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23411
Authors: 
Hackethal, Andreas
Schmidt, Reinhard H.
Tyrell, Marcel
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting 146
Abstract: 
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
Subjects: 
Corporate governance
banking system
co-determination
board of directors
complementarity
financial system
JEL: 
G34
G32
G38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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