Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220 
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dc.contributor.authorChaudhuri, Ananishen
dc.contributor.authorChen, DeeDeeen
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Saraen
dc.contributor.authorMcIntire, Francesen
dc.contributor.authorWinkler, Dawnen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:57Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220-
dc.description.abstractWe study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWellesley College, Department of Economics |cWellesley, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWellesley College Working Paper |x2003-02en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectationsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.titleTo free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn378805673en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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