Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220
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dc.contributor.authorChaudhuri, Ananishen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, DeeDeeen_US
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Saraen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcIntire, Francesen_US
dc.contributor.authorWinkler, Dawnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:57Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220-
dc.description.abstractWe study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually orintermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of freeriding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather thandeciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics |x2003,02en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectationsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.titleTo free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378805673en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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