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Title:To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game PDF Logo
Authors:Chaudhuri, Ananish
Chen, DeeDee
Graziano, Sara
McIntire, Frances
Winkler, Dawn
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics 2003,02
Abstract:We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.
Subjects:Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations
JEL:C72
C92
C91
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Wellesley College

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