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Title:Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game PDF Logo
Authors:Chaudhuri, Ananish
Khan, Sarah Ali
Lakshmiratan, Aishwarya
Py, Anne-Laure
Shah, Lisa
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics 2002,10
Abstract:We use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine individuals? trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ?self-interested? outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others? trust. But, people with low trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ?inconsistent trusters? seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff.
Subjects:Trust ; Reciprocity ; Social Values Orientation ; Sequential Game ; Bargaining
JEL:C91
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Wellesley College

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