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Title:Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure in U.S. Commercial Banking PDF Logo
Authors:Hughes, Joseph P.
Lang, William W.
Moon, Choon-Geol
Pagano, Michael S.
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics 2004,01
Abstract:We extend the literature on the effects of managerial entrenchment to consider how safety-net subsidies and financial distress costs interact with managerial incentives to influence capital structure in U.S. commercial banking. Using cross-sectional data on publicly traded, highest-level U.S. bank holding companies, we find empirical evidence of Marcus? proposition (1984) that there are dichotomous strategies for value maximization?one involving relatively higher financial leverage and the other, lower financial leverage. We find that a less levered capital structure is associated with higher charter value and vice versa. Moreover, differences in charter value result in dichotomous strategies for managerial entrenchment: under-performing, less levered firms hold too little capital while under-performing, more levered firms hold too much.
Subjects:capital allocation
efficiency
agency problems
corporate control
charter value
JEL:G32
D21
D24
G21
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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