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dc.contributor.authorCampbell, Colin M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:49:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:49:04Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161-
dc.description.abstractWe explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics 2003,03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordImplementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordBlackwell?s Orderingen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRisk Sharingen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationswerten_US
dc.subject.stwRanking-Verfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBlackwell's criterionen_US
dc.titleImplementation and Orderings of Public Informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn362925380en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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