Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23132 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper No. 2003-03
Verlag: 
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarbrücken
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words)
Schlagwörter: 
Moral hazard
hold-up
efficient fixed wage
JEL: 
K12
J33
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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