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|Title:||Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions. |
Will, Birgit E.
|Issue Date:||2003 |
|Series/Report no.:||CSLE Discussion Paper 2003-03|
|Abstract:||We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words)|
efficient fixed wage
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes|
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