|
EconStor >
Universität des Saarlandes (UdS) >
CSLE - Forschungsstelle zur Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Universität des Saarlandes >
CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23130
|
| | |
| Title: | | The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution  |
| Authors: | | Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard Pech, Gerald |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CSLE Discussion Paper 2003-01 |
| Abstract: | | Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall the constitution enforcing an unconstitutional law becomes difficult. Citizens? expectations to go unpunished when not complying may be self-fulfilling. Deriving the equilibrium of a global game we show that this mechanism is effectively deterring a government from defecting from a constitutionally permissible tax rate. |
| Subjects: | | tax evasion global games selffulfilling expectations dynamic policy restraints |
| JEL: | | H26 D7 E61 K42 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23130
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|