Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchmidtchen, Dieteren
dc.contributor.authorSteunenberg, Bernarden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:47Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127-
dc.description.abstractIn various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2002-13en
dc.subject.jelK1en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Unionen
dc.subject.keywordcomitologyen
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent-relationshipen
dc.subject.keywordstructure-induced agent discretionen
dc.subject.stwEU-Politiken
dc.subject.stwPolitische Willensbildungen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwcomitologyen
dc.titleEuropean Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn362177686en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200213en

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.