Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127
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dc.contributor.authorSchmidtchen, Dieteren_US
dc.contributor.authorSteunenberg, Bernarden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:47Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127-
dc.description.abstractIn various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2002-13en_US
dc.subject.jelK1en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomitologyen_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent-relationshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordstructure-induced agent discretionen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Willensbildungen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwcomitologyen_US
dc.titleEuropean Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issueen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn362177686en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200213-

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