Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23112
Authors: 
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Neunzig, Alexander R.
Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 2001-03
Abstract: 
Drawing on a new analytical framework provided by the economic theory of optimal legal areas, this paper identifies the factors determining the optimal size of the European Union. It applies this theory to the question of how enlargement affects the welfare of the current and the new members of the European Union as well as that of the non-qualified countries. A welfare analysis reveals that enlargement can be a pareto-superior move. But, it also shows that enlargement can impose a negative externality on those countries left behind. In this case the results of a Kaldor-Hicks test are mixed. Furthermore, it is shown that the enlargement decision of the Union is unlikely to maximize overall welfare.
Subjects: 
enlargement of the European Union
approximation of law
optimal legal areas
JEL: 
D71
F15
F02
P33
K33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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