Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23096
Authors: 
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Neunzig, Alexander R.
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 97-05
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).
Abstract (Translated): 
In diesem Paper wird untersucht, inwiefern Vertrauen die durch die Territorialität des Rechts verursachten vertraglichen Risiken mildern kann, wie effektiv Vertrauen ist, und welcherart seine Auswirkungen auf die sequentielle Struktur des Handels ist. Das Paper stellt einen Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik internationaler Transaktionen dar (NIIT) dar.
Subjects: 
international contract enforcment
trust game
bounded rationality
JEL: 
K12
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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