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Title:Anti-Sharing PDF Logo
Authors:Kirstein, Roland
Cooter, Robert
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CSLE Discussion Paper 2005-03
Abstract:Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.
Abstract (Translated):Anti-Sharing kann das Teilungsproblem der Teamproduktion lösen: Die Teammitglieder versprechen dem Antisharer zunächst einen fixen Betrag. Der Anti-Sharer bekommt den tatsächlichen Teamoutput und zahlt dessen Wert an jedes Teammitglied aus (vermindert um die fixe Zahlung). Wir zeigen, daß der Anti-Sharer im Gleichgewicht unproduktiv ist.
Subjects:team production
sharing problem
bonding
theory of the firm
JEL:C72
L23
D23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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