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dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen_US
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:10Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSLE Discussion Paper 2001-06en_US
dc.subject.jelH2en_US
dc.subject.jelK3en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEmissions Permitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPollution Taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordTime Inconsistencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDurable Goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwDauerhaftes Konsumguten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGovernment Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goodsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503179728en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200106-
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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