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CSLE - Forschungsstelle zur Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Universität des Saarlandes >
CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Haucap, Justus | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kirstein, Roland | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T15:36:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T15:36:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2001 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CSLE Discussion Paper 2001-06 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K3 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Emissions Permits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Pollution Tax | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Time Inconsistency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Durable Goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökosteuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Emissionsrechte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dauerhaftes Konsumgut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steueraufkommen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zeitkonsistenz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 503179728 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
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