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Universität des Saarlandes (UdS) >
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CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23055
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| Title: | | Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device  |
| Authors: | | Kirstein, Roland |
| Issue Date: | | 1997 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CSLE Discussion Paper 97-11 |
| Abstract: | | Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is not only a device to reallocate risk, but also to enhance an insured's position in a settlement negotiation. The paper points out that this function of LCI is especially important in cases that have a negative expected value for potential plaintiffs. Hence LCI is of interest even for risk-neutral customers. |
| Abstract (Translated): | | Rechtsschutzversicherungen (LCI) dienen nicht nur der Risikoallokation, sondern verbessern auch die strategische Position des Versicherten in Vergleichsverhandlungen. Dies gilt insbesondere bei Klagen mit negativem Erwartungswert für den potentiellen Kläger. Dadurch sind LCI sogar für risikoneutrale Kunden interessant. |
| Subjects: | | Legal Cost Insurance Bargaining Settlement |
| JEL: | | K41 G22 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
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