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CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23054
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| Title: | | Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance  |
| Authors: | | Kirstein, Roland Schmidtchen, Dieter |
| Issue Date: | | 1997 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CSLE Discussion Paper 97-07 |
| Abstract: | | Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We introduce a new concept, called judicial detection skill, and show that positive judicial detection skill is a prerequisite if the court system is to deter opportunistic suits and simultaneously induce bilateral contractual compliance. The traditional literature on litigation either assumes judges with zero detection skill, or simply neglects that opportunistic suits might be successful. We prove that those models are unable to provide an answer to the question of how to prevent both types of opportunism simultaneously. |
| Subjects: | | Economic analysis of procedural law judicial detection skill litigational opportunism contractual opportunism |
| JEL: | | C72 K41 K12 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
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