Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23053
Authors: 
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Kirstein, Roland
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 97-01
Abstract: 
Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.
Subjects: 
tax compliance
bounded rationality
imperfect decision-making
detection skill
rule-governed behavior
JEL: 
H26
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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