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dc.contributor.authorSchmidtchen, Dieteren_US
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden_US
dc.description.abstractEven if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSLE Discussion Paper 97-01en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax complianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordimperfect decision-makingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddetection skillen_US
dc.subject.keywordrule-governed behavioren_US
dc.titleImperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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