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dc.contributor.authorKoboldt, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:00Z-
dc.date.issued1995en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23049-
dc.description.abstractUsing James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as repeated games. Furthermore, the implications resulting from the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are analyzed. By using the concept of finite automata to model strategies for supergames, the possible relations with evolutionary game theory are spelled out.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSLE Discussion Paper 95-02en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic movesen_US
dc.titleRational Samaritans, Strategic Moves, and Rule-Governed Behavior: Some Remarks on James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma"en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503141097en_US
dc.description.abstracttransDieser Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel von James Buchanans "Samariter-Dilemma" die Probleme, die es zu lösen gilt, wenn "strategisches Verhalten" im Sinne der Veränderung von Handlungsanreizen durch glaubhafte Drohungen und Versprechen notwendig ist, um Dilemmasituationen zu vermeiden. Dabei werden neben den grundelgenden Strukturen "Einmalspiel" und "Superspiel" auch die Besonderheiten der Annahme von "common knowledge" analysiert, und mit dem Konzept der als finite Automaten abbildbaren Superspielstrategien Brücken zur evolutorischen Spieltheorie geschlagen.en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:9502-
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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