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CSLE - Forschungsstelle zur Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Universität des Saarlandes >
CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23049
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Koboldt, Christian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T15:36:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T15:36:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 1995 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23049 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Using James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as repeated games. Furthermore, the implications resulting from the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are analyzed. By using the concept of finite automata to model strategies for supergames, the possible relations with evolutionary game theory are spelled out. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CSLE Discussion Paper 95-02 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C71 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D63 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D64 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rationality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | altruism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | evolutionary stability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | strategic moves | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Rational Samaritans, Strategic Moves, and Rule-Governed Behavior: Some Remarks on James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 503141097 | | en_US |
| dc.description.abstracttrans | | Dieser Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel von James Buchanans "Samariter-Dilemma" die Probleme, die es zu lösen gilt, wenn "strategisches Verhalten" im Sinne der Veränderung von Handlungsanreizen durch glaubhafte Drohungen und Versprechen notwendig ist, um Dilemmasituationen zu vermeiden. Dabei werden neben den grundelgenden Strukturen "Einmalspiel" und "Superspiel" auch die Besonderheiten der Annahme von "common knowledge" analysiert, und mit dem Konzept der als finite Automaten abbildbaren Superspielstrategien Brücken zur evolutorischen Spieltheorie geschlagen. | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:csledp:9502 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
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