Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23049
Authors: 
Koboldt, Christian
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 95-02
Abstract: 
Using James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as repeated games. Furthermore, the implications resulting from the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are analyzed. By using the concept of finite automata to model strategies for supergames, the possible relations with evolutionary game theory are spelled out.
Abstract (Translated): 
Dieser Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel von James Buchanans "Samariter-Dilemma" die Probleme, die es zu lösen gilt, wenn "strategisches Verhalten" im Sinne der Veränderung von Handlungsanreizen durch glaubhafte Drohungen und Versprechen notwendig ist, um Dilemmasituationen zu vermeiden. Dabei werden neben den grundelgenden Strukturen "Einmalspiel" und "Superspiel" auch die Besonderheiten der Annahme von "common knowledge" analysiert, und mit dem Konzept der als finite Automaten abbildbaren Superspielstrategien Brücken zur evolutorischen Spieltheorie geschlagen.
Subjects: 
rationality
altruism
evolutionary stability
strategic moves
JEL: 
C71
D63
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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