Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22984
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dc.contributor.authorGoerg, Sebastian J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22984-
dc.description.abstractThe notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001). They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic duopoly game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice frequencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura (2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pairwise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a significantly better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The difference between impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not significant. In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and the other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equilibria in which both types of players behave differently. The data exhibit a weak but significant tendency in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2007,9en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcyclic game duopoly experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordimpulse balance equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sample equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleExperimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn534694640en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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