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dc.contributor.authorKovac, Eugenen_US
dc.contributor.authorMylovanov, Tymofiyen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers. We present an example in which stochastic mechanisms perform strictly better than deterministic ones and can implement any outcome arbitrarily close to the first-best. Nevertheless, under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent's bias, the optimal mechanism is deterministic. We provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2006,23en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal delegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent relationshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordno monetary transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic mechanismsen_US
dc.titleStochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Caseen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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