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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22967
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| Title: | | Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency  |
| Authors: | | Gürtler, Oliver Kräkel, Matthias |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2006,22 |
| Abstract: | | We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ine? cient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society´s perspective the agency´s lawsuit may be ine? cient. We can show that these ine? ciencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile. |
| Subjects: | | hostile takeover litigation contest merger |
| JEL: | | L40 D43 K21 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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