EconStor >
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22956
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKranz, Sebastianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22956-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into account selfish players? behavior. Such complier optimal norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2006,11en_US
dc.subject.jelD02en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordrule utilitarianismen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoting-by-feeten_US
dc.subject.keywordcultural evolutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordgolden ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.titleMoral Norms in a Partly Compliant Societyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn514470046en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
bgse11_2006.pdf553.06 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.