EconStor >
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22948
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGoldfayn, Ekaterinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22948-
dc.description.abstractIn order to deliver an innovation principals employ competing agents in some circumstances, while employing research team in other circumstances. This paper compares various structures of R&D to provide a rational behind this observation. It is assumed, that the principal can employ either one agent, two competing agents or two agents, cooperating in a team. Which of the available structures will be chosen by principal, depends on value of prize in stake, technological benefits of team production and team structure. Due to the positive effect on incentives, competing agents always generate larger profit to the principal, than a single agent. Further, they often perform better than the team, even when the latter has significant technological benefits. However, the performance of the team may be improved, if it is organized as a hierarchy with the team leader (who is responsible for allocation of resources) and his subordinate. The paper provides conditions on parameters, which determine whether the principal should employ a team or competing agents for performing R&D.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2006,3en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelO31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordhierarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordteam productionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordorganization of R&Den_US
dc.titleOrganization of RD With Two Agents and Principalen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510389872en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
bgse3_2006.pdf477.55 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.