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dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:12Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22938-
dc.description.abstractThe benefits and costs of di¤erent forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships - play a role as important as formal ones. This paper therefore considers the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds of job design, partial delegation and complete delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the results derived in the absence of informal contracts will no longer hold, if these contracts become available.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2005,32en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordJob designen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordformal contractsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.titleOn Delegation under Relational Contractsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503119814en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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