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dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en_US
dc.description.abstractRecent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce contractual terms that explicitly prevent renegotiation, even if rational and symmetrically informed parties have deliberately signed such a contract. The impossibility to prevent renegotiation can constrain the principal?s abilities to introduce distortions in order to reduce the agent?s rent, so that the first-best benchmark solution will more often be attained.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2005,26en_US
dc.subject.keywordContract modificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.titleShould Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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