Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927
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dc.contributor.authorBudde, Jörgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:06Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927-
dc.description.abstractThe problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both situations, performance measures can be ranked if their likelihood ratio distribution functions differ by a mean preserving spread. The latter result is applied to questions of contest design and more general forms of relative performance payment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2005,21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcontesten_US
dc.subject.keywordinformationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlikelihood ratio distributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten_US
dc.titleInformation in tournaments under limited liabilityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500984883en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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