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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22905
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| Title: | | Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems  |
| Authors: | | Herreiner, Dorothea K. Puppe, Clemens |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,28 |
| Abstract: | | In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of selfinterest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley?s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion. |
| Subjects: | | Fairness Envy Freeness Social Preferences Bargaining |
| JEL: | | D63 C91 C78 A13 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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