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dc.contributor.authorJost, Peter-Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:49Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898-
dc.description.abstractRank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents? strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2004,21en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpreemptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamentsen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTournamenten_US
dc.titlePreemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn473006049en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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