Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890 
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden
dc.contributor.authorHarbring, Christineen
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:44Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890-
dc.description.abstractIn a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x12/2004en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContesten
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordSabotageen
dc.subject.keywordTournamenten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwTournamenten
dc.titleSabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn392675595en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:122004-

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