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Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kräkel, Matthias | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Irlenbusch, Bernd | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Harbring, Christine | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Selten, Reinhard | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-29T15:10:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-29T15:10:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In a contest players compete for winning a prize by exerting effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous and homogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur?s identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Contest | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Experiments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Sabotage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Tournament | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Tournament | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests An Experimental Analysis | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 392675595 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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