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Title:Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests An Experimental Analysis PDF Logo
Authors:Kräkel, Matthias
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Selten, Reinhard
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,12
Abstract:In a contest players compete for winning a prize by exerting effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous and homogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur?s identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.
Subjects:Contest
Experiments
Sabotage
Tournament
JEL:C91
C72
J33
J41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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