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Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22888
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| Title: | | Curbing Power or Progress? : Governing with an Opposition Veto  |
| Authors: | | Morgenstern, Albrecht |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,10 |
| Abstract: | | Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. "divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the governments special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better. |
| Subjects: | | Political Accountability Opposition Veto Divided Government |
| JEL: | | D72 A12 H11 D78 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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