EconStor >
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Curbing Power or Progress? : Governing with an Opposition Veto PDF Logo
Authors:Morgenstern, Albrecht
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,10
Abstract:Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. "divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the governments special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.
Subjects:Political Accountability
Divided Government
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
bgse10_2004.pdf453.75 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.