Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22882
Authors: 
Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.
Apesteguia, José
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,22
Abstract: 
On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The present paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argument, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these findings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma form: the prisoner?s dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players are given the possibility of choosing between two different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly higher in the games that were chosen.
Subjects: 
Freedom of Choice
Self-governance
Social Dilemmas
Framing
JEL: 
H41
C90
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
609.28 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.