Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860
Authors: 
Nautz, Dieter
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,1
Abstract: 
This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbid- ding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbid- ding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbid- ding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.
Subjects: 
Overbidding
repo auctions
monetary policy instruments of the European Central Bank
JEL: 
D44
E32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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